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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jennie Pylican asserts that the State has failed to demonstrate error in the district court’s
order granting her motion to suppress.

The district court suppressed evidence found after

Ms. Pylican was unlawfully seized and her personal property and car searched, absent reasonable
and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At 12 o’clock in the evening, Deputy Geisel observed a car registered to Jennie Pylican
entering a business containing storage units. (3/21/18 Tr., p.36, Ls.20-25.) She entered through
the front gate. (3/21/18 Tr., p.36, Ls.22-25.) Deputy Geisel believed that the storage facility had
closed for the evening, as the hours posted on the gate indicated the business closed at 10:00 p.m.
(3/22/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-11.) After he saw Ms. Pylican’s car go into the facility through the gate,
he heard from another officer that there was another vehicle inside the storage facility with
Ms. Pylican’s car. (3/21/18 Tr., p.38, L.25 – p.39, L.8.) Although Ms. Pylican’s car appeared to
legitimately gain admittance to the facility by means of the entryway gate, Deputy Geisel
became suspicious that Ms. Pylican was breaking into storage units or “doing other type of
activity that’s obviously not conducive to the safe neighborhood.” (3/21/18 Tr., p.39, Ls.12-20.)
Once Ms. Pylican’s car left the facility, Officer Geisel waited until she committed a
traffic violation before he stopped her to investigate what he suspected might be a theft. (3/22/18
Tr., p.17, Ls.14-15.) He pulled the car over inside the driveway of an apartment complex.
(3/21/18 Tr., p.71, Ls.18-20.) He spoke with her about the reason for the stop—her failure to
signal her turn—and the reason why she was in the storage facility after hours. (State’s Exhibit
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2, 0:44-1:19.) After obtaining Ms. Pylican and her passenger’s information, he told her he would
take just a few minutes and then he would “cut you guys loose.” (State’s Exhibit 2, 1:20-3:33.)
Then he noticed the drug dog had arrived. (State’s Exhibit 2, 3:35.) After conferring with the
dog officer and confirming that he should “just get them out now,” he asked both Ms. Pylican
and her passenger to get out of the car so he could run the dog around it. (State’s Exhibit 2,
3:40-4:07.) Deputy Geisel explained that the reason he had Ms. Pylican and her passenger get
out of the car was for everyone’s safety related to the dog sniff. (State’s Exhibit 2, 3:45-3:52.)
Over the next few minutes, he watched while the other officer conducted the drug dog sniff,
before beginning to call the information in to dispatch. (3/21/18 Tr., p.79, L.21 – p.80, L.22;
3/22/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.10-23; State’s Exhibit 2, 4:19-5:48.)
After the dog alerted, the officers searched Ms. Pylican’s car and her purse. (State’s
Exhibit 2, 6:40-29:08; 3/21/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.14-19.) The officers located drug paraphernalia and
methamphetamine residue. (State’s Exhibit 2, 23:20-23:25.) Based on these facts, Ms. Pylican
was charged by Information with one count of possession of methamphetamine and one count of
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.19-20.)
Ms. Pylican moved to suppress the evidence obtained during and after the search of the
vehicle. (R., p.26.) Ms. Pylican filed a brief in support of her motion, arguing that her car and
her bag were searched in violation of her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, as she was
unlawfully seized, and the evidence gathered against her should be suppressed as fruits of the
unlawful seizure and subsequent search. 1 (R., pp.26-38, 44-46.)
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Although the attorney who presented and argued Ms. Pylican’s suppression motion asserted
that the State had violated both her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and her rights
under Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, no specific argument was made asserting the
2

The State opposed the motion. (R., pp.40-43.)
The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. The State stipulated that
Ms. Pylican was seized and a warrantless search was conducted in a place which Ms. Pylican had
a protected privacy interest—her car and her bag. (3/21/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-18.) At the suppression
hearing, Deputy Geisel testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the seizure, search of
the car and bag, and arrest of Ms. Pylican. (See generally, 3/21/18 Tr.)
After the hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement. (3/21/18 Tr., p.95,
L.7 – p.96, L.1.) The next day, the district court held a continued pre-trial conference in which it
orally granted the motion to suppress, finding that Ms. Pylican’s seizure was justified to
investigate the traffic infraction but that she was unlawfully seized and searched absent
reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing when the purpose of the
investigation changed from traffic stop to an investigation for theft relating to her presence in the
storage facility after hours. (3/22/18 Tr., p.18, L.18 – p.19, L.17; R., pp.71-75.) In granting the
motion to suppress, the district court made detailed findings of fact as to what the officer knew at
the time he seized Ms. Pylican, and ultimately concluded that Deputy Geisel delayed the purpose
of the traffic stop to investigate another potential crime absent reasonable articulable suspicion to
justify the second seizure. (3/22/18 Tr., p.8, L.15 – p.19, L.17.) Alternatively, the court held
that the officer’s exit order given for safety purposes for the dog sniff, unlawfully extended the
duration of the traffic stop.2 (3/22/18 Tr., p.27, L.4 – p.28, L.8.) The State appealed. (R., pp.7780.)

Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.26-38; see 3/21/18 Tr.) Therefore, Ms. Pylican will rely upon Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in this appeal.
2
The district court also analyzed and rejected the State’s contention that the doctrine of
inevitable discovery—that the existence of the passenger’s warrant would have served as an
independent objectively reasonable basis for the officer to detain them, had he known about it.
3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it granted Ms. Pylican’s motion to suppress?

(3/22/18 Tr., p.30, L.2 – p.32, L.19.) However, the State has abandoned this argument on
appeal. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) (holding a party waives an issue cited on
appeal if either authority or argument is lacking).

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Granted Ms. Pylican’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Ms. Pylican moved the district court to suppress the evidence seized in violation of her

constitutional rights. In granting the motion to suppress, the district court carefully set forth the
facts known to the officer to determine whether he had reasonable articulable suspicion of other
criminal wrongdoing to extend the duration of the stop beyond that necessary to investigate the
traffic violation. The district court correctly concluded that he did not, and granted the motion to
suppress. This Court should affirm the order granting Ms. Pylican’s motion to suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they
are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014). “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013).
This Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to
the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.

C.

The District Court Correctly Granted Ms. Pylican’s Motion To Suppress
The State has not challenged any of the district court’s factual findings in this appeal. As

such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts found by the district court, the
district court erred in granting Ms. Pylican’s motion to suppress. Ms. Pylican submits that the
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district court’s ruling granting her motion to suppress was amply supported both by the evidence
and by governing case law, and that this Court should therefore affirm the district court.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486
(2009). It guarantees, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.

“Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the

exclusionary rule, which requires unlawfully seized evidence to be excluded.” State v. Lee, 162
Idaho 642, 647 (2017) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963); State v.
Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 (2004)). “Searches conducted without a warrant are considered per se
unreasonable unless they fall into one of the specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions to this general rule.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804, 815 (2009)). The State bears the burden to show the warrantless search falls within a
well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Halen v. State, 136
Idaho 829, 833 (2002).
“When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of proving that the search
or seizure in question was reasonable.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. In addition, even brief
detentions of individuals must meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness. Id.
This means that the detention must be both justified at its inception and reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that originally justified the interference in the first place. Id.
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When the discovery of the evidence to be used against a defendant was the product of his
illegal seizure, it is rightfully suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963).

1.

Deputy Geisel Had No Reasonable And Articulable Suspicion To Seize
Ms. Pylican To Investigate Her Admittance Into A Storage Facility

In this case, Deputy Geisel seized Ms. Pylican pursuant to a valid traffic stop. However,
he expanded his investigation of the traffic infraction in order to determine whether she was
engaged in criminal wrongdoing surrounding her admittance to the storage facility. Although
Ms. Pylican was observed gaining admittance into a storage facility after Deputy Geisel believed
the facility had closed for the evening, such did not give rise to reasonable and articulable
suspicion of criminal conduct. At most, Deputy Geisel had an unsubstantiated hunch.
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is always “the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). Reasonableness hinges on “on a balance between the public
interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a seizure under the Fourth Amendment
“must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require
the seizure of the particular individual, or that seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.” Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (emphasis added). The Brown Court went on to note “we have required
the officers to have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is
involved in criminal activity.” Id. Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable
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facts considered with objective and reasonable inferences that form a basis for particularized
suspicion. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983-84 (Ct. App. 2003). Particularized suspicion
consists of two elements: (1) the determination must be based on a totality of the circumstances,
and (2) the determination must yield a particularized suspicion that the particular individual
being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
“An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those
inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law enforcement training.” State v.
Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 64 (Ct. App. 2009). However, the officer “must be able to articulate
more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion’ or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.”
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-124 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 7 (1989)).
The State contends that Deputy Geisel had reasonable articulable suspicion to investigate
Ms. Pylican’s presence at the storage facility. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.1-8.) However, in arguing
that Deputy Geisel has reasonable articulable suspicion that Ms. Pylican was in the process of
committing a crime, the State relied on information the deputy learned only in his conversation
with her—a conversation the district court found unlawfully extended the duration of the stop.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-8.) The district court concluded that the few questions Deputy Geisel
put to Ms. Pylican regarding her activities at the storage facilities unlawfully delayed the purpose
of the traffic stop. (3/22/18 Tr., p.17, L.16 – p.19, L.14.) Further, the State’s assertion that the
two vehicles were inside the business “when even a customer of the facility should not have been
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able to get access through the gate,” is a conclusion contrary to the district court’s findings of
fact.3 (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)
At the continued pre-trial conference, the district court made the following findings of
fact:
The initial question then, as the State argues and as Deputy Geisel articulated,
absent probable cause for the traffic violation, does Deputy Geisel have a
reasonable articulable suspicion that Ms. Pylican has been engaging in some
wrongdoing that would justify him stopping her vehicle absent a traffic infraction.
I conclude there is not. This is two hours after this storage facility is closed. And
that is essentially all that Deputy Geisel knows. He knows that Ms. Pylican has
accessed this facility apparently using the gate. There’s no indication that she
broke into the facility or hopped over the fence or jimmied [the] gate in order to
get it to work. What he knows is that she is entering the facility after its normally
posted business hours.
The State has proffered no argument that the mere act of doing so would be a
violation of the law. Nonetheless, I have considered that. There is, of course, a
statute that prohibits people from trespassing on property. Generally that involves
a question about permission by the owner. There is a similar county code that
involves or prohibits people from remaining on property after that property has
closed without permission from the owner.
In the case of a storage facility where renters are given means by which to access
the facility even in the absence of the owners or the owner’s agent, I cannot
conclude that Deputy Geisel’s suspicion that this vehicle was able to access the
facility after the normal operating hours was a reasonable basis to conclude that
that person would be committing a crime even if it were a crime to remain on a
private place without the owner’s permission.
Deputy Geisel reached that suspicion because he had, as I indicated before, at
least one, perhaps more than one person tell him that they were renters in this
facility and their codes didn’t work after 10:00. Those people, of course, could
certainly have been lying to Deputy Geisel to explain why they were trying to
access a facility they had no business to access after it was closed.
3

In fact, the district court did not find reliable the information Deputy Geisel used to formulate
his belief that customers of the business could not access the gates after hours. Deputy Geisel
testified that he had conversations with individuals he encountered trying to gain entry and they
told him they were renters and their codes did not work after hours. (3/22/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.17-25;
p.13, Ls.11-19.) The district court also noted that Deputy Geisel had never contacted the owners
or managers of the storage facility to determine if people are eligible to be in the facility after
hours. (3/22/18 Tr., p.13, Ls.20-25.)
9

Deputy Geisel has had no contact with anyone associated with the facility itself.
He has no independent basis to understand how this facility operates or whether
its owners restrict the renters of those units to not access the facility after 10:00
o’clock.
Even if I were to conclude that it is a reasonable belief based on his contracts with
these other people trying to get in after hours, even if his assumption that the
business essentially shuts the key codes off at 10:00 is a reasonable one, I cannot
extend his logic to reach the conclusion that the fact someone is in the facility
after 10:00 o’clock necessarily means they were doing so without the permission
of the owner.
(3/22/18 Tr., p.11, L.24 – p.14, L.9.)
The district court concluded that Deputy Geisel was justified in seizing Ms. Pylican after
he observed her committing a traffic infraction by failing to signal before a turn. (3/22/18
Tr., p.8, Ls.15-20.) The court analyzed the facts known to the officer at the time he began
investigating Ms. Pylican’s actions at the storage facility after hours and concluded that the State
had not met its burden to show that the continued seizure of Ms. Pylican was reasonable. The
district court held Deputy Geisel did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to detain
Ms. Pylican to investigate her presence in the storage facility after hours. (3/22/18 Tr., p.8, L.21
– p.12, L.6.) Deputy Geisel stopped Ms. Pylican’s vehicle to investigate what he suspected was
a burglary where he observed Ms. Pylican’s car enter a business two hours after that business
had closed. (3/22/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.5-8.) The court analyzed the facts known to Deputy Geisel,
and concluded that he had no additional information, other than she apparently accessed the
facility using the gate; there was no indication that she broke into the facility or hopped over the
fence or jimmied the gate in order to get in. (3/22/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.8-15.) The district court
considered whether the mere act of entering the facility after its normally posted business hours
would be a violation of a law such as trespassing or remaining on a closed property without
permission. (3/22/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.13-25.) However, the district court concluded that in the case
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of a storage facility whereby renters are provided means by which to access the facility even in
the absence of owners or an agent, Deputy Geisel’s suspicions were unsubstantiated as he had
never made contact with the owners or managers to determine if people are eligible to be in the
facility after hours. (3/22/18 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-25.)
The district court evaluated the requirement that a reasonable suspicion must be a
particularized one, considering: (1) the assessment must be based on the totality of the
circumstances; and (2) the assessment must yield a particularized suspicion that the particular
individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. (3/22/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.12-18.) The district
court concluded that Deputy Geisel did not have a reasonable suspicion that the individuals
inside the closed storage facility were engaged in some kind of theft, where there was no
indication that they broke into the facility or any storage units. (3/22/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-11.) The
court concluded that the officer only saw two vehicles parked, people get into the vehicles, and
the vehicles drive away, which is an insufficient basis to form a reasonable suspicion that the
individuals are engaged in theft.4 (3/22/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.11-15.)
The district court analyzed the information Deputy Geisel had within the requirement that
reasonable suspicion be particularized and found that Deputy Geisel’s suspicion here appeared to
be wrongdoing consisting of theft, in addition to his general statement that he believed they were
engaged in “other types of activities that are not conductive to the safety of the neighborhood.”
(3/22/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.7-24.) The district court found that, “the mere fact that these vehicles are
in a storage unit after the storage unit has been closed for business – is [not] a sufficient basis

4

Although the court considered Deputy Geisel’s testimony that he saw Ms. Pylican in an area of
the county which has an unusually high number of calls related to thefts, he clarified that those
were vehicle burglaries and residential thefts. (3/22/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-16.) Thus, this
information would not support his suspicion regarding this commercial business. (3/22/18
Tr., p.10, Ls.16-17.)
11

from which the officer could draw a reasonable suspicion that the individuals inside were
engaged in some act of theft.” (3/22/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-7.)
The State has failed to show the district court erred in concluding that Deputy Geisel did
not have a reasonable articulable suspicion that Ms. Pylican was engaged in criminal wrongdoing
regarding her admittance to the storage facility.

2.

Deputy Geisel Unlawfully Extended The Duration Of The Stop By Ordering
Ms. Pylican And Her Passenger To Exit The Car Due To His Safety Concern For
The Officer Running The Drug Dog Around The Car

Although the district court held that the stop was unlawfully extended in order to conduct
an investigation unrelated to the traffic stop, the court also addressed the officer’s exit order—the
other constitutional violation “independent” of the first unlawful extension. (3/22/18 Tr., p.27,
L.4 – p.28, L.8.) The district court found, and the State did not challenge the finding, that
Officer Geisel only ordered Ms. Pylican and her passenger to exit the car in preparation for the
dog sniff—to ensure the safety of the officers while the dog sniff was performed. (3/22/18
Tr., p.25, L.8 – p.27, L.3.) The district court found “that officer safety concern arose from the
decision to walk the dog around the car.” (3/22/18 Tr., p.24, Ls.20-22.) “When the officers in
this case chose to walk the dog around the car, they created the officer safety concern that they
then had.” (3/22/18 Tr., p.26, Ls.17-19.) The district court determined that officer who decide
to undertake an investigation for which they have no reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
conduct cannot then create a danger to themselves and then use that danger to justify extending
the scope or duration of the seizure. (3/22/18 Tr., p.26, L.23 – p.27, L.3.)
Thus, the district court correctly found, consistent with the holding in Rodriguez, that the
officer unlawfully extended the scope and duration of the stop for the safety of the officers while
they conducted a detour from the purpose of the stop. (3/22/18 Tr., p.27, L.4 – p.28, L.8.) The
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court concluded that the exit command to Ms. Pylican and her passenger was an unconstitutional
extension of the scope of the detention apart from its duration. (3/22/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.4-9.)
Further, the court found that the exit command unlawfully extended the duration of the seizure
which should have been limited to investigating the traffic offense. (3/22/18 Tr., p.27, L.10 –
p.28, L.8.)
In support of its argument that the officer’s exit order during the traffic stop did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, the State relied on the holding of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (holding that once a motor vehicle had been lawfully detained for a
traffic violation, police officers could constitutionally order the driver out of the vehicle due to
legitimate concerns for officer safety). (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-10.) The State asserted that the
language of Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1611 (2015) (holding that officer safety
to conduct a search unrelated to the purpose of the stop was not a legitimate basis for extending
the detention), did not alter the holdings of Mimms and its progeny. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-11.)
The State asserted that the district court erred in interpreting Rodriguez as limiting Mimms’
general rule permitting an exit order during a traffic stop. (Appellant’s Brief, p.10; 3/22/18
Tr., p.25, L.12 – p.26, L.19.)
In the portion of Rodriguez relied upon by the State, the Rodriguez Court was addressing
the lower court’s decision necessitating its grant of certiorari. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1611.
After noting that “a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission,”
the Court distinguishing its holding in Mimms:

“The officer-safety interest recognized in

Mimms, however, stemmed from the danger to the officer associated with the traffic stop itself,”
and concluded:
On-scene investigation into other crimes, in contrast, detours from that [trafficcontrol] mission. So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such
13

detours. Thus, even assuming that the imposition here was no more intrusive than
the exit order in Mimms, the dog sniff could not be justified on the same basis.
Highway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the Government’s
endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular.
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (internal citations omitted).

During a lawful traffic stop, the

officer may instruct the driver to exit the vehicle, and this procedure is within the police officer’s
discretion and is not otherwise unlawful. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111 n. 6; State v. Parkinson, 135
Idaho 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2000).

However, Mimms was a case in which the officer routinely

asked every driver to exit the vehicle during a traffic stop. Id. 434 U.S. at 109-110. Here, the
district court found that Deputy Geisel asked Ms. Pylican and her passenger to exit the vehicle
not as a routine part of a traffic stop, but for officer safety concerns pertaining only to the dog
sniff. (3/21/18 Tr., p.23, L.17 – p.24, L.22.)
The district court correctly suppressed the evidence seized as the result of the unlawful
detention of Ms. Pylican and the unlawful search of her bag and her car. For these reasons,
Ms. Pylican respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order suppressing the
evidence unlawfully obtained.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Pylican respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s Order Granting
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
DATED this 3rd day of January, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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